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A commentary on
The embodied brain: toward a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience
by Kiverstein, J., andMiller, M. (2015). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9:237. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00237
There is a tension between the embodied approach to cognition (e.g., Varela et al., 1991;
Anderson, 2003; Wilson and Foglia, 2011; Myachykov et al., 2014) and the neurocentric way of
thinking. It manifests in the research on mirror neurons (Caramazza et al., 2014), action language
understanding (Meteyard et al., 2012), or decisionmaking (Kubanek and Snyder, 2015), to mention
just a few examples. In spite of radically embodied approaches to neuroscience (Thompson and
Varela, 2001; Favela, 2014), the integration of neuroscience and embodiment is still a challenging
requirement (Haselager et al., 2008; van Dijk et al., 2008; Gallagher et al., 2013). Kiverstein and
Miller’s (2015, further: K&M) new paper should be read in that context.
My main concern is that K&M’s main argument begs the question. I would summarize it as
follows:
1. Emotions are essentially connected with the state of a whole organism and action related.
2. In the brain, emotional, and cognitive processes are tightly interconnected.
Therefore:
3. Cognition is essentially connected with the state of whole organism and action related.
This argument appeals to neuroscience [mainly Pessoa (2014) and Anderson (2014)] to argue
for embodiment of cognition1, not for embodied neuroscience. Therefore, K&M’s approach
on embodied cognitive neuroscience (further: ECN) begs the question: i.e., to have embodied
neuroscience, we must assume embodiment. But perhaps this assessment is unfair? Notice that
there are two issues that K&M deal with: (a) revision of the division of labor, and (b) whole organism
and environment determine the function of neural networks. I start from the second problem.
K&M write:“To determine the precise functional contribution of a network to an animal’s
behavior we must look at how this network functions in the context of a wider organism-
environment system” (p. 2). But what does it mean? Perhaps they mean “the functions a given
network performs (. . . ) in (. . . ) a context-dependent manner” (ibid.)? If this is the case, then this is
not ECN. Context-dependency is an important feature of cognition, but it’s not enough for ECN,
and it could be endorsed easily by a more traditional cognitive neuroscience.
1K&M focus on emotion and cognition, but in this commentary I reduce this to the problem of embodied cognition in
general.
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The second issue is the revision of division of labor. K&M
say that in cognitive neuroscience, we should replace cognitive
psychology with dynamic ecological psychology, but this is
problematic. The whole idea of the division of labor is now
quite contentious (Poldrack, 2010; Anderson, 2015). So we must
indicate not only what to replace, and with what, but also how
to do it. First, the role of cognitive psychology in cognitive
neuroscience may seem problematic (Poldrack, 2010). Second,
replacing it with ecological psychology is not an easy task (for
further information on its complexity, see: Costall, 2007).
There is yet another problem with this strategy. K&M write:
“[c]ognitive neuroscience then seeks to determine how (. . . )
cognitive operations are carried out by brain. . . ” (p. 2). If we
apply the same strategy to ECN (as K&M do) and explain
phenomena in embodied cognitive science neuroscientifically,
we will still discuss embodied cognitive science. We will
face the problem of a vanishing difference between embodied
cognitive science and ECN, and this is why we should
interpret embodiment in neuroscience differently. To defend
it, one should first argue for embodied brain functions, and
then account for cognitive processes using properly embodied
neuroscience.
My argument is not only that brain networks are dynamic
and context-dependent, but if neuroscience is embodied, these
networks should be extended to non-neuronal body parts2. So,
not only they are part of a larger system, but they themselves are
larger—extended to some bodily (and perhaps environmental)
factors. An important starting point might be Wilson and Foglia
(2011, W&F) and Wilson and Golonka (2013, W&G). W&G
argue that to explain cognition we should focus on a specific
task and the resources used during the task. In this context,
we can ask: How important is the brain as a resource? What
does the brain do when we perform this task? In the case of
2An interesting new example of such a case is the role of body-environment
interaction during catching the ball by an outfielder described by Clark (2015) as a
part of primary neuronal process of predictive error minimization.
embodied cognition, one thing is certain—the brain doesn’t
perform this task alone, and the non-neural body also has a job
to do! W&F indicate that during cognition the body can play
the role of a distributor, constraint or controller. When the body
is a distributor, brain function is replaced by the non-neural
body. When the body is a controller, brain activity is modulated,
inhibited or amplified by non-neural bodily processes. When the
body is a constraint it prevents some cognitive processes (e.g.,
bodily construed temporal frames for cognitive performances).
Obviously, these roles are notmutually exclusive, rather they have
constant mutual interaction, amplification, and modulation, to
the degree that the role played by the brain in ECN requires
a new conceptualization. The brain executes only a part of the
cognitive duties, and it is not always the same part (quantitatively
and qualitatively).
I think that a good supplement to this line of thinking would
be recent works of Pessoa (2014) about dynamic affiliations and
Anderson (2014) about TALoNS (Transiently Assembled Local
Neural Subsystems). These studies are not (yet) part of ECN, but
they could be. What would be needed for that? i.e., we should
extend dynamical temporal integration or dynamic affiliation to
the role played by a non-neural part of body in this process (e.g.,
self-structuring information, see: Lungarella and Sporns, 2006).
Hence, we need “extendedTALoNS”3. Such an account will be
quite consistent with that proposed by W&G in their views on
cognition as a dynamical assemble of resources. And because of a
lack of such (or similar) approach in K&M, their main argument
begs the question.
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